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Abstract:  Many oil, mineral, and plantation crop-based economies experienced a 
substantial deceleration of growth since the commodity boom and bust of the 1970s and 
early 1980s.  Rodrik (1999) has demonstrated that the magnitude of a country’s growth 
deceleration since the 1970s is a function of both the magnitude of the shocks and a 
country’s “social capability” for adapting to shocks.  In this paper, we demonstrate that in 
this respect countries, with what we term “point source” natural resource exports are 
doubly disadvantaged.  Not only are countries with these types of exports exposed to terms 
of trade shocks, but the institutional capability for responding to shocks is itself 
endogenous and negatively related to export composition.  Using two different sources of 
export data and classifications of export composition, we show that point source and 
coffee/cocoa exporting countries do worse across an array of governance indicators 
(controlling  for a wide array of other potential determinants of governance).  This is not 
just a function of being a “natural resource” exporter, as countries with natural resource 
exports that are “diffuse” do not show the same strong differences—and have had more 
robust growth recoveries.   
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The rentier state is a state of parasitic, decaying capitalism, and this circumstance cannot fail to 
influence all the socio-political conditions of the countries concerned. 
 
      Vladimir Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism
1 
 
It matters whether a state relies on taxes from extractive industries, agricultural production, 
foreign aid, remittances, or international borrowing because these different sources of revenues, 
whatever their relative economic merits or social import, have powerful (and quite different) 
impact on the state’s institutional development and its abilities to employ personnel, subsidize 
social and economic programs, create new organizations, and direct the activities of private 
interests. Simply stated, the revenues a state collects, how it collects them, and the uses to 
which it puts them define its nature. 
 
Terry Karl, The Paradox of Plenty
2 
 
[I]t is useful to contrast the conduct of governments in resource-rich nations with that of 
governments in nations less favorably endowed. In both, governments search for revenues; but they 
do so in different ways. Those in resource-rich economies tend to secure revenues by extracting 
them; those in resource-poor nations, by promoting the creation of wealth. Differences in natural 
endowments thus appear to the shape the behavior of governments. 
 
    Robert Bates, Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development
3 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Is oil wealth a blessing or curse?  Norway provides a hopeful example, but Azerbaijanis are 
rightly concerned whether their country can handle the potential bonanza from newly discovered 
oil fields.  While government officials have promised that oil revenues will go to schools, 
hospitals and roads, no formal plans are in the offing; meanwhile, neighboring Caspian Sea 
nations are despotically ruled, ethnically divided, and weakened by corruption—problems some 
fear will be made worse by oil
4.  The controversy over the construction of the pipeline in Chad 
                                                 
1 Cited in Ross (2001: 329, fn. 6) 
2 Karl (1997: 13) 
3 Bates (2001: 107, fn. 1) 
4 According to the chief UN representative in Azerbaijan, “This wealth ... will create a lot of problems.  It 
will increase the already substantial gap between the rich and poor, and eventually it will affect political stability” 





demonstrates that even in an extraordinarily poor country, not all believe that additional wealth 
pouring into government coffers will lead to better times.     
Both resource scarcity and abundance have been cited as a primary cause of civil war.  
Some have argued that land scarcity is behind the Rwandan conflicts (e.g., Klare, 2001), but 
resource-rich countries have not escaped civil strife.  Angola had been embroiled in conflict 
since the mid 1970s, and the “problem” there is not scarce land, but rather abundant sources of 
oil and some of the world’s best diamonds (Campbell, 2002).  Just as revenues from diamonds, 
timber, coffee and gold in the eastern half strengthened (then) Zaire’s elite, revenues from Col-
tan are now strengthening the rebel Rally for Congolese Democracy
5.  Rebels in Sierra Leone are 
financed from diamond mines, and are perhaps fighting over nothing else except for control over 
them.   
What mechanisms might explain the conditions under which resource abundance 
becomes a problem rather than part of a solution to development?  We add to the burgeoning 
literature on natural resources and performance by documenting one way in which countries' 
sources of export revenue affect economic growth
6.  We show that export concentration in what 
we term “point-source” natural resources—those extracted from a narrow geographic or 
economic base such as oil, minerals (e.g. copper, diamonds), and plantation crops (e.g. 
bananas)—is strongly associated with weak public institutions which are, in turn, strongly 
associated with slower growth.  This paper presents econometric evidence to support the 
hypothesis that not only is institutional capacity to handle shocks a determinant of economic 
                                                 
5 Columbine-tantalite (Col-tan) has recently been declared ‘the wonder mineral of the moment’: when 
processed, it is vital for the manufacture of capacitors and other high tech products. 
6 The most recent literature on the effects of natural resources on growth includes Auty 1995; 2001; 
Leamer et al 1999; Leite and Weidmann 1999; Ross 1999, 2001; Sachs and Warner 1995 [2000], 1999; Stijns 2001; 





growth since the “commodity shocks” of the 1970s and 1980s (Rodrik 1999), but that 
institutional capacity itself varies across economies with different sources of export revenue, and 
that it is these export structures that influences socioeconomic and political institutions.   
Figures 1 and 2 (from Woolcock, Pritchett and Isham 2001) illustrate the growth 
performance facts we are trying to (partially) explain.  Figure 1 shows the smoothed (over three 
years) median developing country annual growth rate of GDP per capita.  From the mid 1950s 
until the late 1970s this was consistently above 2 percent.  But since 1980 the developing 
economies have endured a growth collapse of “Grand Canyon” proportions, with growth near 
zero for much of the period.  Figure 2 is even more striking, as it shows that the growth 
performance of ninety developing economies classified by their export structure in 1985 (we turn 
to the exact definitions of the categories below).   Countries that were exporters of manufacturers 
have not experienced a growth deceleration at all.  All natural resource exporters suffered 
substantial slow-downs, but the deceleration was much more severe and lasted much longer for 
“point source” and “coffee/cocoa” exporters than for countries whose principal exports were 





Figure 1: Smoothed Median Per Capita Growth Rates 


























































We focus on the variety of resource experience and show that export composition—both 
between natural resources and manufactures but also amongst different types of natural 
resources—influences the quality of political institutions.  Section II discusses the literature on 
natural resources and growth, in particular the range of hypotheses that are consistent with a link 
between resource composition and governance.  Section III discusses our two measures of export 
structure.  Section IV shows the link between these and indicators of governance, and then 
completes the circle by showing the link between indicators of governance and economic growth 
since.  Section V concludes, with some speculations for “policy.” 
 
II: Development of our hypothesis 
 
Ross’s (2001) excellent empirical investigation into the mechanisms by which oil undermines 
democracy outlines several possible channels or “effects” through which oil affects political 
outcomes.  We draw on his analysis to discuss three such mechanisms: rentier effect, delayed 
modernization effect, and an entrenched inequality effect.  All of these are consistent with a 
negative link between particular types of resources and government capacity.      
Rentier States.   Political scientists generally—and area specialists in particular—argue 
that certain natural resources undermine development through what they term “rentier effects” 
(Ross 2001)
7.  When revenues can be easily extracted from a few sources that are easily 
                                                 
7  Some historians of the early modern state (e.g., Chirot, 1998) argue that the increasing cost of modern 
armies led to greater demands on the state’s ability to raise revenues, which led to one of several outcomes.  States 
with access to exogenous resources (e.g. the Spanish crown) did not have to extract resources from the domestic 
population and so did not develop any of the forms of the modern state.  In other cases, either (a) an accommodation 
was reached between the sovereign and other classes about their permission/assistance in taxation (classic case: 





controlled there are three consequences.  First, for any given revenue target, the state has less 
need for taxation of the population, and without the pressure for taxation the state has less need 
to develop mechanisms of deep control of the citizenry.  By the same token, citizens have less 
incentive to create mechanisms of accountability and develop the deep “civil society” and 
horizontal social associations that many feel are the “preconditions” of democracy (Lipset 
(1959), Moore (1966), Putnam (1993), and Inglehart (1997)).   Second, with the “exogenous” 
revenues, the government can mollify dissent through a variety of mechanisms (buying off 
critics, providing the population with benefits, infrastructure projects, patronage or outright 
graft).   Third, the state has resources to pursue direct repression and violence against dissenters.  
Delayed Modernization.  For influential scholars such as Barrington Moore (1966), the 
story of wealth, power, and political and economic transformation begins with some smallish 
group of elites owning the most valuable resources (usually land); from this land they extract a 
surplus from the peasants in some way or another (serfdom, slavery, feudal exactions), but then 
economic circumstances change so that industrialization is necessary.  Modernization requires 
that  (a) some of the surpluses be transferred from existing activities to new industrial activities, 
(b) at least some of the labor be moved to the new activities, and (c) a more sophisticated system 
be put in place to manage the political pressures generated by urbanization and the demands of 
new semi-professional urban dwellers and business groups
8.  This combination of economic 
transformations sets off a series of shifts in political power that can lead in various directions 
depending on how the coalitions of landed elite/rural producer/urban labor/new 
industrialists/urban “middle class” plays out. This process can go more or less rapidly and can 
                                                                                                                                                             
inability to mobilize revenues because of conflicts between sovereign and nobles meant that eventually one got 
gobbled (classic cases: Poland, Hungary).   





lead to representative democracy, fascism, corporatism, Marxist dictatorships, or oligarchies 
(Moore 1966).  Recently, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) have used similar arguments 
in which the mortality of settlers plays a crucial role in determining the structure of economic 
production and hence institutions.  In high mortality environments, settlers concentrated only on 
rent extraction from high value added products and hence did not “invest” in developing high 
quality government institutions. 
Moreover, states who control a “point source” resource would resist industrialization 
because it means creating several alternative sources of power (urban labor, urban middle class, 
urban industrialists) each of whom, as their power grows, will want to tax away (or just 
confiscate) the quasi-rents from the natural resources.  In the cross section of levels, this implies 
that countries that are still today dominated by “point source” products are also likely to be 
dominated by elite politics of one type or another.  In this case we do want to bring the OECD 
countries in, because they are countries that successfully made the transition from agricultural 
production to industrialization (and beyond) and in the process created functioning democratic 
polities (although via very different paths—the US/UK path to democracy is very different from 
the French, Prussian/German, or Japanese one).  Indeed, viewed over the span of the last hundred 
years, it is only quite recently that resource-poor countries have become systematically wealthier 
than resource-rich countries (see Auty 2001: 5). 
Political scientists have long argued that states dependent on natural resources tend to 
thwart secular modernization pressures—e.g. higher levels of urbanization, education, and 





that deploys sophisticated technical skills that can only be acquired abroad (e.g., oil is largely 
extracted by foreign, not domestic, firms). As a result, neither economic imperatives nor workers 
themselves generate pressures for increased literacy, labor organizations, and political influence.  
Concomitantly, citizens are therefore less able to effectively and peacefully voice their collective 
interests, preferences, and grievances (even in nominally democratic countries such as 
Zimbabwe and Jamaica).  In short, resource abundance simultaneously “strengthens states” and 
“weakens societies”, and thus yields—or at least perpetuates—low levels of development (cf. 
Migdal 1988).
9 
Entrenched Inequality.   The “entrenched inequality” effect is that the export composition 
affects economic and political outcomes by affecting the social structure.  Economic historians 
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000) argue that the diverging growth trajectories of South and 
North America over the last two hundred years can be explained by reference to the types of 
crops grown, the extent of property rights regimes enacted to secure their sale, and the timing 
and nature of colonization.  In North America, crops such as wheat and corn were grown on 
small family farms, cultivatable land was relatively abundant, but de-colonization occurred early 
and innovative property rights ensured that land (and assets more generally) could be sold on an 
open market.  In South America, by contrast, crops such as sugar, coffee, and cocoa were grown 
on large plantations, cultivatable land was relatively scarce, de-colonization occurred late, and 
property rights were weak.  Landed elites were able to amass great personal fortunes, resist more 
                                                 
9 There are many variants on the way in which resources delay modernization, which center on different 
connections between states and elites.  The state can own the rents and a regime of rentier autocrats emerges, as with 
Algeria and Nigeria; or, rentier capitalists can effectively own the state, as in Angola and El Salvador, and oligarchic 





democratic reforms, and consolidated power.
10  During downswings, vested interests thus resist 
reforms that would diversify the economy, because this would create “rivals” competing for 
labor and government influence.
11  Certain types of natural resources are thus predisposed to 
generating an influence on the long-run level of development: ergo, North America’s resource 
base enabled it to became rich, but South America’s did not.
12   
The social dimension of “entrenched inequality” is that some areas of geographic space 
are conducive to small-holder production on individually owned plots.  The interactions among 
these producers tend to be horizontal relationships of equality.  In other areas of geographic 
space, production is conducive to large-scale production (e.g. plantations of bananas).  In these 
regions the relationships tend to bind each person to a social superior (noble, land-owner), and 
the horizontal relationships among producers tend to be ones of distrust.  This economic 
structure then produces a social structure that is conducive to “bad” politics (clientelism) and to 
“bad” governance (since citizens cannot cooperate to demand better services from the state). 
Implications of all three stories.   We do not propose that the empirical results below are 
the “test” of some particular model; rather they are consistent with a variety of possible models.      
First, all involve some connection from the structure of economic production, and in 
particular exports, to some measure of the capacity and quality of government.  Second, it is not 
                                                 
10 From this perspective, the warmer southern states in North America, with their plantation crops 
(tobacco) and enduring commitment to slavery, were a microcosm of the larger contrast between North and South 
America. 
11 See Tornell and Lane (1999) for a model of how special interests can dampen economic growth.  On the 
institutional side, their argument is very much in the spirit of this paper: they also note (echoing Barro 1996) that 
one possible explanation for the distributive struggle in many countries is the attempt to appropriate rents generated 
by natural resource endowments. 
12 Consider the contrast between Argentina and United States. Carlos Diaz-Alejandro conjectured the entire 
difference in political and economic evolution between Argentina and the United States can be explained by the fact 
that in Argentina land gets better from west (last settled) to east (first settled), while in the USA land gets better 
from east (first settled) to west (last settled).  Hence in Argentina, population growth led to larger and larger rents on 
the good land that was divvied up early while in the USA the western expansion rapidly undermined the position of 





just exports of “natural resources” that matter, but the production characteristics.  The actual 
geographic pattern of production matters, particularly as it affects the ease with which the state 
can control and extract the “rents.”  In particular, while others have focused (rightly) on 
dimensions of natural resource exports such as lack of diversification
13 and exposure to secular 
terms of trade decline (and volatility), we stress the effect of exports on politics and only then 
indirectly on economic performance.  Third, while many of our stories for growth involve very 
long run effects, there is also a connection with changes in growth rates through the combination 
of weak institutions and shocks.  
 
III.  Creating a measure of export structure 
 
Our hypothesis can therefore be stated as follows. Different types of natural resource 
endowments matter for economic growth by generating a differential capacity to respond to 
economic (and other) shocks.  In particular, countries dependent on point-source natural 
resources and plantation crops are predisposed to heightened social divisions and weakened 
institutional capacity, which in turn impede their ability to respond effectively to shocks. The 
effective and equitable management of shocks—and economic transitions more generally—is a 
key to sustaining rising levels of prosperity. 
In this paper we take the link between endowments and export structure as given—that 
countries with oil are more likely to export oil and that countries can only export crops like 
coffee and cocoa if they have appropriate climates.  This link has a reasonable base in theory and 
                                                                                                                                                             
century liberals—advocates of free trade, property rights, limited government, no industrial policy (except for 
processing of raw materials like refrigeration for beef). 
13 Note that our classification of “diffuse” is about the conditions of production of any given commodity, 





evidence.  Our measures of the “quality” of government are typically from the 1980s and 90s.  
We use export structure from prior to that period so that, at least with respect to post-1980 
growth and currently assessed institutional quality, export structure is pre-determined.  The weak 
link in determining the chain of causation is that it is possible that historical factors affect 
institutions and this in turn determines whether a country will develop a manufacturing 
capability and export manufactures, and hence the link between poor governance and exports is 
caused by poor governance.  However, this argument is much less compelling against the 
arguments about the differences of types of natural resource exports.   
A)  Data on export composition 
To test this hypothesis we create classifications of export structures according to their natural 
resource base using two methods.    
First, we use UNCTAD’s Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics 
(1988) for data on the leading exports of every country in 1985 that had a GNP per capita under 
$10,000 and a population greater than one million.  We classified countries based on their top 
two SITC three digit exports into four types:   
•  ‘Manufacturing exporters’, who relied on exports of manufactures (without regard to 
labor or capital intensity).  
•  ‘Diffuse’ economies, which have relied primarily on animals and agricultural produce 
grown on small family farms (e.g., rice and wheat). 





crops (e.g. sugar); 
•  ‘Coffee and cocoa’ economies, which have relied primarily on these two commodities 
(classifying them as either ‘point source’ or ‘diffuse’ proved problematic since these 
crops can be grown either on plantations or small family farms, but since these tree crops 
rely on a long time scale and are immobile, they are potentially susceptible to rent 
extraction from small holders via marketing boards.)  
We relied on judgments from country and commodity experts when there was some 
ambiguity about a country’s classification.  The countries used in this analysis, with their 
classifications, are presented in Appendix Table 1, which also lists the description of the first and 
second most important export categories with their share in total exports.   
The second method was to compute four indices of ‘net export shares’ that mirror our 
four classifications of the types of exports: (1) manufacturing; (2) diffuse, (3) point source, and 
(4) coffee and cocoa.  To construct these four indices, the World Trade Analyzer from 1980 was 
used to aggregate SITC codes at the two-digit level into our four export categories, following the 
approach of Leamer et al. (1999).  To calculate the ‘net export share’ for each sub-category, net 
exports (X-M) of sub-category i is divided by the sum of the absolute value of net exports across 
all sub-categories (following the procedure in Leamer et al.,1999).  The four indices are then 
calculated as the sum of the net export shares for each sub-category in each of the four 
categories.  By construction, these indices have a range of –1 to 1, with a higher number 
indicating a greater relative reliance on the corresponding category for export earnings.   





‘manufactures index’ is -.02 for the manufactures exporters compared to -.38, -0.35, and –0.43 
for the resource exporters.   The diffuse, point source, and coffee and cocoa indices are highest 
for each of the corresponding set of UNCTAD-based classifications (in the rows), so that moving 
diagonally in the lower right of the table, 0.08, 0.28, and 0.16, respectively are higher than other 
row entries
14.   
Table 1: Export compositions and the natural resource base of selected developing economies 







Diffuse index  Point source 
index 
Coffee and Cocoa index 




-0.02  -0.05  -0.12  0.01 
Diffuse   -0.38  0.08  -0.04  0.04 
Point source  -0.35  0.01  0.28  0.04 
Coffee and 
cocoa 
-0.43  0.06  -0.02  0.16 
Notes: means of selected export and trade related data for 90 developing economies.  See text for 
descriptions of country classifications, data and data sources. 
 
B)  Differences in growth and institutional quality across export categories 
We now begin to develop our argument that the nature of export composition—measured by 
these four indices—affects economic growth via political and social institutions.  First, Table 2 
shows the growth story that we introduced with Figures 1 and 2.  Since 1974, growth rates have 
been massively different between developing countries that export manufactures and resource-
exporter countries—almost 4 percentage points per annum different (4.58 versus 0.65).  The 
difference is due in large part to the different in the deceleration of growth.  Whereas the growth 
                                                 
14 The classification of countries also produces reasonable results when compared with standard sources 
like the World Development Indicators (WDI) (1999).  Over the 15 year period before the oil shock manufactures 





in the exporters of manufactures increased by one percentage point, that of the resource 
exporters decelerated by almost two percentage points (1.89) for a three percentage point 
differential (these magnitudes of growth rate differences maintained over time have enormous 
implications—if two countries begin with equal income today the country growth three 
percentage points faster would be more than twice as rich in only 22 years).  More importantly 
for our hypothesis about the importance of the composition of natural resource exports, growth 
rates are also significantly different (using the Mann–Whitney test) between the types of 
resource exporters.  Diffuse economies have done almost as well as their pre-oil shock 
performance (decelerating by “only” 0.43), while point source have decelerated by 2.57 
percentage points and coffee/cocoa economies have decelerated by 1.65 percentage points.   




Classification of resource exports: 
 
All  All   
Diffuse  Point 
source 
Coffee/ cocoa 
GDP per capita growth rates per annum 
1957 – 97  4.16  1.43  **  1.74  1.57  0.76 
1957 – 74  3.56  2.54    2.03  3.08  1.73 
1975 – 97  4.58  0.65  **  1.60  0.51  0.08 
Period 
Difference 1975-97 less 1957-74  1.02  -1.89    -.43  -2.57  -1.65 
* significant at 5% level and ** significant at 1% level for Mann-Whitney test of similar distributions  
in resource-poor and resource-exporter countries.  
 
Second, in Table 3, we also compare the averages across these exporter classifications for 
eleven institutional variables, which have been used as indicators of “institutional quality” in the 
empirical growth literature
15.  There is no question that the manufactures exporters appear to 
                                                 
15  These “institutional” variables that have been used recently in a set of papers on the institutional 
determinants of economic growth (Knack and Keefer 1995; Rodrik 1999a, Kaufmann et al. 2000; Dollar 2000, 





have higher institutional quality—the indicator is lower among the resource-exporter countries in 
all cases and for six of these this difference is statistically significant
16.  However, the 
differences among the types of resource exporters are not impressive: while diffuse exporters 
tend to have better institutional quality, the differences are small and not statistically significant.     
 
Table 3: Institutional quality and export composition among ninety developing economies. 
Resource-exporter 
Type of  resource exports: 










Number of countries:  9  81    18  45  18 
Source  Variable             
Rule of law  0.33  -0.45  **  -0.40  -0.40  -0.66 
Political instability and 
violence 
0.28  -0.38  *  -0.27  -0.40  -0.43 
Government effectiveness  0.32  -0.41  *  -0.45  -0.35  -0.51 
Control of corruption  0.23  -0.41  *  -0.37  -0.36  -0.57 




Regulatory burden  0.40  -0.17    -0.14  -0.19  -0.11 
Law and Order Tradition  3.81  2.85  *  2.80  2.89  2.81  ICRG 
Quality of the Bureaucracy  3.71  2.59  **  2.52  2.63  2.55 
Political rights  3.98  3.28    3.50  3.26  3.12  Freedom 
House  Civil Liberties   3.56  3.35    3.49  3.33  3.24 
CPIA  Property rights and rule-
based governance 
3.60  3.37    3.53  3.28  3.42 
Notes: The sources for these institutional variables are Kaufmann et al. (2000) (for KKZ), Easterly 
(2000) (for ICRG and Freedom House) and World Bank (2002) (for CPIA).  
* significant at 5% level and ** significant at 1% level for Mann-Whitney test of similar distributions 
in resource-poor and resource-exporter countries.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
from the Penn World Tables and the World Development Indicators (World Bank 1999).  Measures of social and 
political data were adapted from Kaufmann et al. (2002)
15, Easterly (2000), and World Bank (2002). 
16 From the KKZ data, ‘rule of law’, ‘political instability’, ‘government effectiveness’, and ‘control of 





IV.  Regressions:  government quality and exports  
 
Using our continuous indices of export composition, we can move beyond the simple cross-tabs 
in two ways.  We use regressions that measure the intensity of the export concentration within 
type, and the regressions control for the composition of all four types for each country.  We 
estimate a two equation system.   In the first, institutional variables are endogenously determined 
by export composition as well as the other correlates of institutional quality that have been 
proposed in the literature—e.g., a country’s share of English and European language speakers, 
latitude, and ‘predicted trade share’ (Hall and Jones (1999), Kaufmann, Kraay, Zoboda (2000) 
and ethnic fractionalization (as used in Ritzen, Easterly, and Woolcock 2000, Alesina, et al. 
2002).  Growth is then determined by institutions (and the other usual suspects from the growth 
regression literature).   
We estimate an equation for each of six indicators of institutional quality measured in the 
1990s (‘rule of law’, ‘political instability and violence’, ‘government effectiveness’, ‘control of 
corruption’, ‘regulatory framework’, and ‘property rights and rule-based governance’) as a linear 
function of the four indices of net export composition measured in 1980, plus five other 
(relatively) predetermined variables: ‘English language’, ‘European language’, ‘distance from 
equator’, ‘predicted trade share’, ‘ethnolinguistic fractionalization’, all of the usual growth 
determinants (X's listed below), and a set of regional dummies.  
Growth over the period 1975 to 1997 is estimated as a linear function of an indicator of 





achievement, the Sachs-Warner indicator of trade openness, changes in the terms of trade, and 
the share of primary exports to GDP, and a set of regional dummies.   







0 1990 , = + + + + + = ￿ ￿ ￿
= = =



















s i e b b b b
 
 (2)  Growthi = a0 + a1* Iij + a2*Xi +  ?i 
In particular, we call attention to two of the growth determinants.  First, we include in the 
growth regression the terms of trade, to be sure that we are not simply capturing the effect of 
falling terms of trade.  Second, we also include the share of primary exports to GDP, which was 
done in a pair of influential papers by Sachs and Warner (1995 [2000], 1999), who argue that 
having abundant natural resources makes you less competitive in manufacturing exports, and 
manufacturing exports have some happy features like learning spillovers that make them “extra 
good” for growth.   Originally we thought that the channel through institutions might be a better 
“explanation” of the presence of the “primary share” in a growth regression.  However, including 
the regional variables in a sample of developing countries already makes the pure “primary 
exports” variable statistically insignificant.  Even so, we include the share of exports that are 
“primary” as a growth regressor, because this means we can be sure the impacts of export 
structure are due to the composition among types of primary exports, not simply that any natural 
resource has the same impact.   
First, we present the results for estimating equation (1), based on a three-staged least 
squares (3SLS) estimation of this system of equations.
17  These results establish whether 
                                                 
17 3SLS estimates are more efficient than IV estimates if the error terms below are correlated and the sytem 





measures of the natural resource endowment—using the four indices derived from Statistics 
Canada—predict the nature of socioeconomic and political institutions.  Table 4 illustrates the 
results of equation (1) for the six chosen institutional variables.
18  As shown in the first two 
rows, neither the ‘manufactures index’ nor the ‘diffuse index’ are statistically significant 
predictors of any of the six institutional variables.   
                                                 
18 From 62 to 66 of the 90 countries that are used to derive Tables 1and 2 have the required data to estimate 
these models.  The countries included in these estimations are noted with an asterisk in the second column of 






Table 4:  The effect of the natural resource endowment on institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)












Manufactures index -0.02 0.05 -0.48 0.02 -0.49 -0.27
(0.23) (0.29) (0.26) (0.24) (0.30) (0.24)
Diffuse index -0.08 -0.27 -0.39 -0.21 0.05 -0.29
(0.34) (0.45) (0.40) (0.36) (0.45) (0.35)
Point source index -1.48 ** -2.09 ** -1.47 ** -0.95 ** -1.09 ** -1.22 **
(0.26) (0.33) (0.30) (0.26) (0.34) (0.27)
Coffee and cocoa index -2.05 ** -3.26 ** -1.64 * -1.41 * -1.60 -1.07
(0.69) (0.87) (0.82) (0.71) (0.89) (0.69)
Ethnic fractionalization 0.0027 0.0018 0.0027 0.0004 0.0022 0.0059 *
(0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0023)
Predicted trade share 0.06 0.06 -0.09 0.12 0.04 -0.13
(0.10) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11)
Latitude -0.0058 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0047 0.0007 -0.0010
(0.0044) (0.0057) (0.0051) (0.0045) (0.0056) (0.0042)
English language 0.10 -0.44 0.04 0.09 -0.08 -0.25
(0.29) (0.36) (0.33) (0.29) (0.37) (0.28)
European language 0.92 ** 1.18 ** 1.11 ** 0.96 ** 0.99 * 1.10 **
(0.32) (0.40) (0.37) (0.32) (0.42) (0.32)
GDP per capita 0.127 ** 0.195 ** 0.150 ** 0.060 0.058 0.071
(0.046) (0.059) (0.053) (0.047) (0.061) (0.051)
Secondary school achievement 0.024 * 0.001 0.029 ** 0.034 ** 0.029 * 0.034 **
(0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009)
Trade openness 0.55 ** 0.31 0.34 0.17 0.43 -0.01
(0.20) (0.25) (0.23) (0.20) (0.27) (0.19)
Change in terms of trade  -0.01 -0.09 -0.14 -0.60 ** -0.37 -0.45 *
(0.18) (0.23) (0.23) (0.18) (0.24) (0.20)
Share of primary exports/GDP  1.27 * 1.46 * 1.23 * 0.15 0.89 1.77 **
(0.53) (0.68) (0.61) (0.55) (0.71) (0.52)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.18 0.60 0.44 0.28 0.25 0.15
(0.28) (0.36) (0.33) (0.29) (0.37) (0.31)
Europe and Middle East 0.87 ** 0.95 * 0.95 ** 0.78 ** 0.58 0.79 *
(0.29) (0.37) (0.34) (0.30) (0.39) (0.33)
Latin America -0.49 0.21 -0.37 -0.36 0.03 -0.22
(0.33) (0.42) (0.38) (0.34) (0.43) (0.36)
East Asia 0.16 0.43 0.51 0.08 0.41 0.23
(0.29) (0.38) (0.34) (0.30) (0.40) (0.31)
Adjusted r-squared 0.71 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.51 0.64
Sample size 66 65 64 64 66 62
Notes:  test of the effect of natural resouce base indicators on six instiutional variables.  See text for descriptions 





     By contrast, as shown in the third row, the ‘point source index’ is statistically significant 
in all six specifications: ceteris paribus, an increased dependence on point source natural 
resources is associated with much worse institutions.  From the fourth row, the ‘coffee and cocoa 
index’ is significant in specifications (1) – (4).
19  As for the other regressors in this model, 
‘European language,’ ‘Secondary school achievement,’ and ‘Europe and the Middle East’ are 
also statistically significant predictors of these institutional variables.
20   
What are the relative magnitudes of the effects of other significant regressors?  Table 5 
lists the equivalent of ‘beta coefficients’ from this 3SLS estimation.
21  The values for ‘point 
source index’ (from –0.38 to –0.71) are either the largest (columns 1 and 2) or second largest 
(columns 3 – 6) compared to the values of ‘European Language’ and the other significant 
variables.
22   The values for ‘coffee and cocoa index’ (from –0.13 to –0.37) are generally 
comparable to those of ‘GDP per capita.’   
                                                 
19 The p-values for specifications (5) and (6) are 0.07 and 0.12, respectively. 
20 A small note about the scale and definition of ‘Per capita GDP (1975)’ in this table: it is in US$1000, 
adjusted for purchasing power parity. 
21 Figures are calculated as the product of the coefficient and the standard deviation (from the regression 
sample) of the listed variable, divided by the standard deviation of  the dependent variable. 






Table 5:  The relative magnitude of the effect of the natural resource endowment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)











-0.58 -0.71 -0.57 -0.41 -0.38 -0.46
-0.27 -0.37 -0.21 -0.20 -0.18 -0.13
0.53 0.59 0.63 0.61 0.50 0.60
0.32 0.44 0.38 0.17 0.13 0.17
0.26 0.01 0.31 0.40 0.28 0.35
0.25 0.12 0.15 0.08 0.17 0.00
0.21 0.21 0.20 0.03 0.13 0.27




Share of primary 
exports/GDP 
Point source index









           What are the absolute magnitudes of the effects of the natural resource variables?  From 
specification (1), a country whose ‘point source index’ fell by a standard deviations
23 (=0.266)—
the approximate difference between Angola (0.70) and Cameroon (0.42)—would increase ‘rule 
of law’ by 0.39; a country whose ‘coffee and cocoa index’ fell by a standard deviations 
(=0.88)—the approximate difference between Colombia (0.22) and Ecuador (0.14)—would 
increase ‘rule of law’ by 0.37.  Since the standard deviation of ‘rule of law’ is 0.68, these 
represent substantial institutional improvements.  To illustrate, the estimated effect of a decrease 
in one standard deviation of the ‘point source index’ and of the ‘coffee and cocoa index’ yields a 
total change of ‘rule of law’ by 0.76, based on the calculations above: this is the equivalent of the 
difference between Sri Lanka (-0.31) and Thailand (0.44).  Given their relative and absolute 
magnitudes, these overall results are consistent with our first hypothesis: that both point source 
and coffee and cocoa dependence are critical determinants of socioeconomic institutions.   
Next, in Table 6, we present the results of estimating the growth equation to show the 
strong impact of institutions on post-1974 growth.  Five of the six OLS models (specification 1) 
suggest that institutions are a positive and significant determinant of economic growth among 
these developing countries from 1975 to 1997.  By contrast, when the four natural resource 
indices are used as the identifying instruments (specification 2), this generates an estimate that is 
significant with all six institutional variables—and the point estimate is also greater than the OLS 
point estimate (which is consistent with the presence of a plausible degree of measurement error 
in the indicators of institutional quality).  When the languages variables and ‘latitude’ are added 
to the natural resource instrument set (specification 3), this produces broadly similar results.   
                                                 
23 Here and with the ‘beta coefficient’ calculations above, we use the standard deviations from the 






The presence of alternative valid instruments for institutions allows us to test the 
“exclusion” restriction—that is, that export composition affects growth only insofar as it affects 
institutions (intuitively, the test is an F-test of the inclusion of the four export composition 
OLS 3SLS 3SLS
(1) (2) (3)
Instrument set - Natural 
resources
Full W and 
natural 
resources
Rule of law 1.33 ** 1.36 ** 1.30 **
(0.33) (0.50) (0.44)
66 66 66
Political instability 0.68 * 0.79 * 0.79 *
(0.27) (0.37) (0.35)
65 65 65
Government effectiveness 1.14 ** 1.56 ** 1.35 **
(0.32) (0.56) (0.46)
64 64 64
Control of corruption 0.79 1.59 * 1.35 *
(0.40) (0.81) (0.64)
64 64 64
Regulatory framework 1.00 ** 1.85 ** 1.55 **
(0.30) (0.70) (0.57)
66 66 66
Property rights and rule-based 
governance 1.51 ** 2.50 ** 1.66 **
(0.38) (0.82) (0.54)
62 62 62
Note:  OLS and 3SLS with various instrument sets, as discussed in the text






indices in the growth regression with a consistent estimate for the effect of institutions; see 
Davidson and MacKinnon 1993, Hausman-Taylor 1991).  We find no evidence that export 
composition should be included in the growth regression.   
The results in this section comprise the econometric punch line of this paper.  First, both 
point source and coffee and cocoa dependence negatively affect national socioeconomic 
institutions.  Second, institutions that are endogenously determined by the nature of natural 
resource dependence are significant determinants of growth.   
What are the implications of this two-stage effect?  In the first part of this section, we 
noted that a large change in the composition of a country’s natural resource endowment—a one 
standard deviation change in point source and coffee and cocoa dependence—is associated with 
a relatively large improvement of our measures of socioeconomic institutions.  How might such 
an improvement translate into a change of economic growth?  Using the results from Table 4 and 
specification (3) in Table 6, we calculate the estimated effect of a decrease in one standard 
deviation of the ‘point source index’ and of the ‘coffee and cocoa index’ on economic growth, 
via better institutions.  These calculations yield an annual increase of per capita growth from 
between 0.51 to 0.75.  Using the median of these figures (0.68), this translates into a GPD per 
capita that, ceteris paribus, is 19 percent higher, 25 years after the oil shock, among countries 






V:  Discussion and conclusion 
 
At first glance, ours are stultifying results for the policymaker: like Putnam’s (1993) medieval 
guilds and choral societies, it is hard to imagine how a policymaker interested in accelerating 
growth can change what we have identified as one possible underlying cause of poor 
performance—a country’s natural resource endowment makes for poor institutions.  We admit: it 
is hard to get beyond this first glance.   
But here’s why we think it is important to shed light on these results. World Bank (1998) 
illustrated the power of institutions in development assistance, and what donors should (and most 
importantly, should not) do in the face of varied institutional performance among potential aid 
recipients.  Our results suggest how entrenched—and ‘environmentally determined’—poor 
institutions can be  (cf. Wade (1988), at micro level).  So these results, in a certain sense, further 
raise cautions about casual attempts at institutional reform.  Poor institutions are deeply rooted. 
Where others (e.g., Rodrik 1999) have shown how important institutional quality and social 
inclusion are to managing growth generally and growth volatility in particular, these results push 
the chain of causation back further one step further, showing that, pace Karl (1997: 13), “the 
revenues a state collects, how it collects them, and the uses to which it puts them” does indeed 
“define its nature”. Institutions surely matter a lot, but types of natural resource endowments and 
the corresponding export structures to which they give rise (rather than “geography”), play a 
large role in shaping what kinds of institutional forms exist and persist.  





is not obvious.  In Chad, for instance, outside factors (notably the World Bank) have created 
‘institutional’ conditionality regarding the use of the resources from the oil pipeline that they are 
helping to finance.  (Perhaps this will work, but so far money is still going, defiantly, to the 
purchasing of arms).  In contrast, in Qatar the head of state recognizes that the natural resource 
gravy train—including  the institutions that have gone with it—is leaving the station.  He is 
attempting reform from within and he has decreed (?!) that Qatar will become a democracy: 
censorship is out, universal suffrage and elections are in.     
We are hopeful that in some cases, donors can—if they’re lucky—gently nudge along 
such reforms.  At the very least, donors should not maintain (perceived) ‘lifeline’ aid that 
prevents the likelihood of nascent reforms from even getting started.  Regarding client countries 
as mere repositories for the steady flow of highly valued—in both the economic and geo-political 
sense—natural resources such as oil and diamonds, rather than genuine partners in the 
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Appendix Table 1: Details on the export classifications derived from UNCTAD data
Export 
classification

















Manufacturing Bangladesh 1985 Woven textiles, textile 653 656 20, 19 65.8
China 1985 Vehicles Parts, knitwear 784 845 6, 5 35.9
* Hong Kong Manufacturing
* India 1985 Pearl, clothing 667 841 11, 9 58
* Korea, Republic 1985 Ships, clothing 735 841 16, 14 91.3
Nepal 1985 Floor cover, clothing 657 841 15, 12 59.1
Singapore Manufacturing
Taiwan, China
Turkey 1985 Clothing, Textile 841 651 16, 6 61
Diffuse * Argentina 1985 Wheat, Oil seeds and nuts 041 221 13, 10 66.1
* Burma / Myanmar 1985 Rice, Wood 042 242 31, 33 56.5
* Gambia 1985 Oil seeds, veg oils 221 421 25, 21 84
Guinea-Bissau Fruits
* Honduras 1985 Fruit, coffee 051 071 38, 25 84.7
Lesotho
* Malaysia 1985 Crude petrol, veg oil 331 442 23, 13 31.5
* Mali 1985 Cotton, Live animals 263 001 56, 30 58.6
Mozambique 1984 Fish, fruit 031 051 36, 19 69
* Pakistan 1985 Cotton, rice 652 042 12, 12 61.9
Panama 1985 Fruit, Fish 051 031 28, 21 78
* Philippines 1985 Special trans, Veg oil 931 422 30, 9 26.9
* Senegal 1985 Fish, Veg oils 031 421 14, 13 38
Somalia 1985 Live animals, Fruit 001 057 79, 18 85.6
* Sri Lanka 1985 Tea, Clothing 074 841 39, 22 47.4
* Thailand 1985 Rice, Veg 042 054 13, 9 46.2
* Uruguay 1985 Wood, Meat 262 011 19.3, 14.8 46.1
* Zimbabwe 1985 Tobacco, Pig Iron 121 671 23, 12 36.3
Point source * Algeria 1985 Petroleum products, crude petrol 332 331 36, 32 97.6
Angola 1985 Crude petrol, petroleum products 331 332 76, 5 84.9
* Benin 1982 Cotton, Cocoa 263 072 32, 27 46
* Bolivia 1985 Tin, gas 687 341 23, 52 55.7
Botswana Diamonds
* Burkina Faso 1985 Cotton, Live animals 263 001 47, 13 56.8
* Chad 1980 Cotton, Live animals 263 001 61, 18 79.8
* Chile 1985 Copper, nonferrous ore 682 283 33, 10 58.3
* Congo 1985 Crude petrol, petroleum products 331 332 89, 4 93.3
* Dominican Repub. 1985 Sugar, pig iron 061 671 28, 14 42.7
* Ecuador 1985 Crude petrol, coffee 331 071 64, 7 66.7
* Egypt 1985 Crude petrol, cotton 331 263 51, 13 68.1
Fiji Sugar










* Indonesia 1985 Crude petrol, gas 331 341 48, 18 68.6
* Iran 1987 Crude petrol, tapestry 331 657 95, 2 95.8
Iraq 1985 Crude petrol, fruit 331 051 95, 0 98.8
* Jamaica 1986 Inorganic elements, nonferrous metals 513 283 40, 20 51.9
* Jordan 1985 Fertilizers (crude), Fertilizer (manu.)271 561 35, 14 43.3
Liberia 1985 Iron, rubber 281 231 63, 19 62.9
* Malawi 1983 Tobacco, tea 121 074 48, 24 96
* Mauritania 1985 Iron, fish 281 031 44, 40 58.3
* Mauritius 1985 Sugar, clothing 061 841 47, 29 49.8
* Mexico 1985 Crude petrol, petroleum products 331 332 56, 5 60
* Morocco 1985 Fertilizers, Inorganic elements 271 513 23, 16 40.5
Namibia
* Niger 1981 Uranium, live animals 286 001 81, 14 80
* Nigeria 1985 Crude petrol, cocoa 331 072 90, 2 96.7
Oman
Papua New Guinea  1985 Nonferrous metal, Coffee 283 071 35, 14 45.1
* Paraguay 1985 Cotton, Oil 263 221 43, 33 49.5
* Peru 1985 Petrol, nonferrous metal 332 283 16, 14 40.8
Saudi Arabia
* Sierra Leone 1985 Pearl, Nonferrous metal 667 283 36, 26 34.8
* South Africa 1985 Special, Coal 931 321 54, 6 34.2
Sudan 1985 Cotton, Oil Seeds 263 221 48, 15 71.3
* Syria 1985 Crude petrol, petroleum products 331 332 49, 19 74.1
* Togo 1985 Fertilizers, Cocoa 271 072 49, 16 53.6
* Trinidad & Tobago
* Tunisia 1985 Crude Petrol, Clothing 331 841 40, 17 44.5
* Venezuela 1985 Crude petrol, petroleum products 331 332 46, 29 80
* Zaire 1985 Copper, Crude petrol 682 331 45, 22 44.2
* Zambia 1985 Copper, zinc 682 686 88, 2 93.4
Coffee/cocoa * Brazil 1985 Coffee, petroleum products 071 332 10, 7 37
* Burundi 1985 Coffee, tea  071 074 84, 6 92.2
* Cameroon 1986 Coffee, cocoa 071 072 28, 22 52.5
Central African Repub. 1985 Coffee, Wood 071 242 35, 24 41.6
* Colombia 1985 Coffee, petroleum products 071 332 51, 13 59.3
* Costa Rica 1985 Coffee, fruit 071 051 30, 24 60.5
* Cote d'Ivoire 1985 Cocoa, Coffee 072 071 32, 25 68
* El Salvador 1985 Coffee, Sugar 071 061 63, 4 51.3
Ethiopia 1985 Coffee, hides 071 211 63, 13 71.2
* Ghana 1985 Cocoa, Aluminum 072 684 66, 6 69.3
* Guatemala 1985 Coffee, Crude veg materials 071 292 35, 8 58.1
* Haiti 1985 Coffee, Clothing 071 841 27, 16 74.2
* Kenya 1985 Coffee, tea 071 074 27, 25 63.6
* Madagascar 1985 Coffee, spices 071 075 39, 29 79.2
* Nicaragua 1985 Coffee, Cotton 071 263 38, 33 58.2
* Rwanda 1985 Coffee, Tin 071 687 43, 9 76.4
* Tanzania 1985 Coffee, Cotton 071 263 39, 11 68.1
* Uganda 1985 Coffee, Hides 071 211 71.3, 6.9 90
Notes:  Export classifications based on data from UNCTAD (1988)
   Countries marked with * are included in the econometric models documented in Tables 3 and 4.





Appendix 2:  Indices of net export 
The Statistics Canada World Trade Analyzer database provides data for 600 commodity groups for 
192 countries for up to 19 years, 1980 through 1998.  Statistics Canada is responsible for the 
compilation of the data which is organized according to Standard International Trade 
Classification (SITC).  Appendix table 2 describes the mapping from two digit SITC codes into 
our classifications.   
Category  Sub-category  
Two digit SITC codes (from the World Trade 
Analyzer 2002) 
Manufactures  Labor Manufactures  66  82  83  84  85  89  91  93  96        
   Capital Manufactures  61  62  65  67  69  81              
   Machinery  71  72  73  74  75  76  77  78  79  87  88  95 
   Chemicals  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59        
Diffuse  Animal products  0  1  2  3  21  29  43  94          
   Cereal products  4  8  9  12  22  26  41  42          
   Forest products  24  25  63  64                  
   Tropical temporary   5  6  7  11  23                
         minus tropical permanent components    
Point source  Petroleum products  33                        
   Materials  27  28  32  34  35  68              
Coffee and cocoa  Tropical permanent  57  616  615  611  711  712  720  722  723  2320       
 
For additional detail on the rationale behind the grouping, see (Leamer 1984).  We thank 





Appendix Table 2: Data names and sources
Variable name Year(s) Source
Dependent variable
N Mean STD N Mean STD
Per capita growth rate 1975 - 1997 World Bank (2002) 90 1.05 2.39 66 0.92 2.13
Natural resource variables
Manufactures index 1980 Statistics Canada (2002) 88 -0.339 0.267 66 -0.333 0.248
Diffuse index 1980 Statistics Canada (2002) 88 0.025 0.178 66 0.044 0.185
Point source index 1980 Statistics Canada (2002) 88 0.115 0.275 66 0.116 0.266
Coffee and cocoa index 1980 Statistics Canada (2002) 88 0.059 0.082 66 0.066 0.088
Possible determinants of institutions
Ethnic fractionalization 1972 Easterly (2000) 84 48.6 29.5 66 48.2 30.7
Predicted trade share -- Hall and Jones (1999) 89 2.73 0.64 66 2.70 0.64
Latitude -- Hall and Jones (1999) 89 6.20 18.09 66 6.22 18.18
English language -- Hall and Jones (1999) 88 0.04 0.16 66 0.04 0.19
European language -- Hall and Jones (1999) 89 0.20 0.36 66 0.25 0.39
Possible determinants of economic growth
GDP per capita 1975 World Bank (2002) 90 2.21 2.03 66 2.13 1.74
Secondary school achievement 1975 Barro and Lee (1995) 90 8.80 7.09 66 9.40 7.36
Trade openness 1965- 1990 Sachs and Warner (1995) 85 0.19 0.33 66 0.17 0.31
Change in terms of trade  1975 - 1997 World Bank (2002) 80 -0.22 0.26 66 -0.22 0.27
Share of primary exports/GDP  1971 Sachs and Warner (1995) 81 0.16 0.15 66 0.15 0.11
Sub-Saharan Africa -- -- 90 0.46 0.50 66 0.44 0.50
Europe and Middle East -- -- 90 0.12 0.33 66 0.11 0.31
Latin America -- -- 90 0.24 0.43 66 0.32 0.47
East Asia -- -- 90 0.11 0.32 66 0.08 0.27
Institutions
Rule of law 2000/01 Kaufmann et al. (2002) 89 -0.37 0.72 66 -0.38 0.68
Political instability and violence
2000/01 Kaufmann et al. (2002) 87 -0.31 0.83 65 -0.32 0.78
Government effectiveness 2000/01 Kaufmann et al. (2002) 86 -0.33 0.78 64 -0.33 0.69
Control of corruption 2000/01 Kaufmann et al. (2002) 86 -0.34 0.68 64 -0.38 0.62
Voice and accountability 2000/01 Kaufmann et al. (2002) 90 -0.30 0.77 66 -0.21 0.77
Regulatory burden 2000/01 Kaufmann et al. (2002) 89 -0.11 0.78 66 -0.06 0.71
Law and Order Tradition 1984-1998 Easterly (2000) 78 2.95 0.95 59 2.90 0.81
Quality of the Bureaucracy 1984-1998 Easterly (2000) 78 2.70 0.99 59 2.72 0.92
Political rights 1972-1998 Easterly (2000) 89 4.66 1.54 65 4.53 1.51
Civil Liberties  1972-1998 Easterly (2000) 89 4.63 1.27 65 4.48 1.20
Property rights and rule-based 
governance 1997 World Bank (2002) 81 3.39 0.73 62 3.49 0.59
Note: last columns are sample sizes, means, and standard deviations for the entire sample and the regression sample.






Appendix Table 3: Determinants of economic growth: 1974  - 1997   
Specification
Estimation procedure
Constant 4.15 ** 4.71 ** 4.19 ** 4.21 ** 4.42 ** 4.12 **
(0.86) (1.26) (0.89) (0.86) (1.14) (0.85)
Rule of law 1.33 ** 1.86   1.36 ** 1.38 ** 1.58   1.30 **
(0.33) (0.97) (0.50) (0.45) (0.84) (0.44)
GDP per capita -0.11 -0.15 -0.11 -0.11 -0.13 -0.10
(0.13) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Secondary school achievement -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Trade openness 2.15 ** 1.79   2.12 ** 2.11 ** 1.97 * 2.16 **
(0.73) (0.92) (0.72) (0.70) (0.85) (0.70)
Change in terms of trade  -1.62 ** -1.64 ** -1.62 ** -1.62 ** -1.63 ** -1.62 **
(0.63) (0.59) (0.57) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57)
Share of primary exports/GDP  -1.36 -1.63 -1.37 -1.38 -1.49 -1.34
(1.68) (1.64) (1.55) (1.54) (1.60) (1.54)
Sub-Saharan Africa -3.43 ** -3.43 ** -3.43 ** -3.43 ** -3.43 ** -3.43 **
(0.83) (0.77) (0.76) (0.76) (0.76) (0.76)
Europe and Middle East -2.38 * -2.61 ** -2.39 ** -2.40 ** -2.49 ** -2.36 **
(0.94) (0.96) (0.87) (0.87) (0.93) (0.87)
Latin America -2.89 ** -2.83 ** -2.88 ** -2.88 ** -2.86 ** -2.89 **
(0.83) (0.78) (0.76) (0.75) (0.76) (0.75)
East Asia -1.05 -1.06 -1.05 -1.05 -1.05 -1.05
(1.04) (0.97) (0.95) (0.95) (0.95) (0.95)
Adjusted r-squared 0.47 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.56
Sample size 65 65 65 65 65 65
Instruments Partial W's NR Partial W's 
and NR
Full W's Full W's 
and NR
Hausman test -- 0.95 0.57 0.89 0.96 0.92
Overidentification test -- 0.97 0.30 0.72 0.90 0.76
Hausman-Taylor test -- -- -- 0.64 0.51 0.66
Notes:Dependent variable is the anuual growth rate in GDP: 1975 - 1997.
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level.  P - values listed for the three final statistical tests. 
See the text for descriptions of the variables, the econometric specifications, and the statistical tests.
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